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1. Introduction 
It is often claimed that 'the really important difference 
between the [neoclassical and the Cambridge theories of 
growth and distribution lies] on the determination of invest-
ment in the economy. Does savings with proper government 
intervention determine investment, that is, is investment 
sufficiently elastic that it can be made equal to desired 
savings, or does the distribution of income adjusts savings 
to investment?,2) It seems, therefore, that the long run 
impact of alternative investment behaviour is of considerable 
importance, and it is into this I wish to explore. 
It is generally recognized that the problem of the determi-
nation of investment in all growth models is extraordinarily 
demandingl ), and I apologize for not being able to propose 
a satisfactory theory of investment presently. My point is 
a different one. I will try to show in ,the follgwing that 
a~~erna~~ve assumptions about investment,behaviour are capable 
. 
of leading to crucially divergent results, 
1) paper presented to the Winter Symposium of the "Econ.ometr"ic 
Society, Budapest, January 26th-28th~' 1974. I would like 
to thank W.VOGT for heloful conversations. 
2) STIGLITZ/UZAWA P. 313 
3) BLISS p. 1, KALDC)R (1961") p. 21 0 ~ 
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The impact of alternative investment behaviour can be analyzed 
rather transparently in Kaldorian growth models, since these 
models are always containing an investment function which needs 
only to be replaced by the respective alternatives we wish to 
study. It would be more difficult to incorporate suitable in-
vestment functions into neoclassical growth models 1 ), although 
I feel that one could frame the following considerations neo-
classically, too. 
There seems to be some disagreement pertaining to Kaldorian 
growth models. As STIGLITZ and UZAWA put it, 'neoclassicists 
accuse the Cambridge school of ad hoc-ery,2), and this reproach 
is certainly not unfounded regarding the technical progress 
function in Kaldorian models. But the corresponding neo-
classical deu8 ex machina, i.e. the innovation posSibilit~ 
frontier, can be legitimately attacked on the same ground I. 
On the other hand, the Kaldorian theory is much simpler 
concerning the treatment of technical progress. It is not 
necessary to introduce those shifting parameters of the 
production function called efficiency of capital and of labour, 
respectively, which are so difficult to interpret 4), and to 
postulate an invariant relationshio between the corresponding 
airy growth rates. On the contrary, Harrod neutrality comes out 
quite naturally, even without mentioning it. 
The points which I want to raise can be discussed most 
simply in a malleable capital framework ~used by KALDOR 
(1957,1961). The vintage approach, ~s o~tline~ in KALDOR/ 
lULRRLEES would make things very difficult indeed, and this would 
perhaps overshadow the main concern. I want to keep things simple. 
1) se~on this the important paper by BLISS. For the so-called 
REYNES-WICKSELL-models, see e.g. FISCHER. 
2) p. 310 n.3 
3) STIGLITZ/UZAWA p. 121 f. 
4) SAMUELSON p.355 
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2. The Mode~ Framework 
2.1. The Technical Progress Function 
~enote output by Y, capital by K and labour by N. Y = YIN 
is labour productivity, and k = KIN is capital invested per man. 
KALDOR assumes that the rate of capital deepening k deter-
mines the growth of productivity 91 ). This is described by the 
technical progress function (Figure): 
'" ( 1 y = ¢(k), - ¢(o»o, ¢I>O, ¢"<O, ¢(K)=K for some K>O 
y 
¢(k) 
K 
k 
K 
In other words, if capital invested per man remains constant 
through time, there will be some increaseSin productivity. 
Increasing investment per man allow~ for a higher productivity 
growth, but with decreasing returns. Furthermore, if the rate 
of capital deepening exceeds a certain critical value K, the 
induced rate of productivity growth ~ill be smaller than the 
rate of capital deepening. 
1) KALDOR (1957,1961). Regarding notation: Let x(t) be a real 
function of time t. We write * for dx(t)/dt'and x for x/x. 
It should be noted that the concept of capital as used in 
neoclassical models differs slightly from the present use: 
In neoclassical models, K is interpreted as an index of the 
aggregate capital stock. Resources ""hich have been devoted 
to the production of technical progress are excluded. In 
contrast, the Kaldorian notion of capital refers to aZZ in-
vestment expenditures which have been made, even those made 
for research1 ). There is no distinction between the 'capital 
stock' and the 'level of technique', as a consequence, and 
it is maintained that such a distinction is not very useful 
since there is not much sense in distinguishing between out-
lays for machinery and expenditure for the development of its 
construction. Instead it is assumed from the beginning that 
investment expenditure is distributed optimally among its 
different uses. 
Define 
(2 ) -x: = y /k = Y /K 
as the output-capital ratio implied by y and k. The technical 
progress function can be interpreted as determining the changes 
of the parameters of the Leontief production function 
(3 Y = min -{ y. N, x· K 1 
over time which are dependent upon capital deepening2 )-: 
:pz .. 
1) depreciation excluded 
2) y can be interpreted as the rate of labour-augmenting 
technical progress and x as the rate of capital-augmenting 
technical progress, cf. SOLQW et al.p. 82. Technical pro-
sress is Hicks-neutral.for k=o and Harrod-neutral for 
k=K, etc. Eliminating k from (4) gives the innovation 
possibility curve as derived by KENNEDY, p. 547 n.1, but 
this obscures perhaps the Kaldorian view that it is the 
rate of capital deepening which determines the bias and 
there is no choice of the bias independent of capital 
deepening. 
5 
(4) y = cp (k) x = k 
2.2. The Working of the Model in the Simplest Case 
In order to get some feeling of how the model works, it is 
perhaps appropriate to discuss the models' behaviour in the 
simplest possible case1 ). 
We assume that investment K is a constant fraction s of out-
put Y. 
. (5) K = s·y , o < s < 1 
Concerning population growth we will assume here and throughout 
the paper exponential growth with rate n. 
(6) N = n n > 0 
From k = KIN and (2),(5) ,(6) we find 
(7 ) k(x) = s·x - n 
if full employment is assumed. Inserting (7) into (4) gives 
a differential equation for x 
(8) x = CP(k{x) - k{x) 
1) The working of the model has not always been clear. McCALLUM 
for instance has conjectured a'tendency to instability in 
Kaldorian growth models recently. I hope to elucidate in the 
following that this conjecture is not very well founded.On the 
stability of the 1957-model, see CHAMPERNOWNE. 
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Since k(x) is an increasing function of x , and since "" > x < 0 
... 
if k(x) ~ K ,(8) has the unique st~ble solution x defined by 
... 
k(x) ~ K • In the tong run~ a constant saving ratio impties 
that productivity grows with rate K~ the rate of capitat deepe-
ning is K~ and the output-capitat ratio will remain constant. 
1.3. Interaction of Saving and Investment 
TO assume investment to be a constant fraction of income is 
very plain indeed, and KALDORs view of how the level of invest-
ment is determined is not as simple as that. He assumes that 
there is a saving function with a savings ratio dependent 
on profits' share in the economy, and an investment function 
which might be dependent on profits, too. Changes in profit 
margins will equalize planned savings and planned investment, 
and thereby the actual share of profits and actual saving and 
investment is deter~ined. We have to go into this in the 
following. But from the foregoing analysis at least this can 
be said: If the rate of capital deepening~ which resutts from 
the interaction of saving and investment,can be written as an 
increasing function of the output-capitat ratio, the same re-
sutt as in the last section witl be obtained~ and the average 
savings ratio witl eventually remain constant 1 ). 
1.4. Savings Behaviour 
A real w~ge rate w implies the rate of profits 
(9) r = Y - w.N K = x·{1 - ~} y 
1) The savings function and the investment function in KALDORs 
1957 model together with the short run stability condition 
(16) discussed below imply just that. Thus CHAMPERNOWNEs 
stability result is easily gefteralized for the case of a 
nonlinear technical progress function. 
since r is what remains of 
employed, after wage costs 
duced, and profits share is 
(10) 'II' = r·K y- = 
the 
per 
r 
-x 
7 -
output per unit of capital 
unit of capital have been de-
We assume the savings ratio to be an increasing function of 
this quantity. 
11) s ('II') , o < s' < s <1 for all 'II' e; (0,1) 
i.e. total savings S is 
(12 ) S = 
Behind (11) lies the assum~tion that there is saved more out of 
profits than out of wages, partly because 'caoitalists' save 
more than 'wage earners', partly because some fraction of total 
profits will be retained by the firms and will not constitute 
a part of the income of profit earners. Since retained profits 
are all saved by definition, this contributes to the positive 
association between the share of profits and the average 
propensity to save. 1 ) 
1.4. The Determination of the Share of Profits 
The share of profits is determined through the interaction 
of the savings function and the investment function. The in-
vestment functions I wish to study will be specified later, 
1) See KALDOR (1956) p.95 and (1966) p.316 f. KALDOR writes 
~('II') = sK· w + SN" (1-'11'),0 < s < s· < 1, which is a special 
case of (11). - N K-
See also STIGLITZ/UZAWA p.310f. 
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but assume for the moment a given investment behaviour for 
f ' h d' 'b t' h' 1) the purpose of clari YJ.ng t e J.strJ. U J.on mec anJ.sm • 
Assume for example that investment is determined by the 
rate of profit r. Since r = n·x, investment is a function 
of profit's share n and other variables. 
( 13) I = I (n , ••• ) 
At full employment, excess demand in the commodity market 
relative to output Y is a function of pofi~share and other 
variables, too: 
(14 ) e (n , ••• ) I-S 1 = -y- = y ·I(n, .••• ) - sen) 
Now the Keynesian vie\Ol would be that changes in output 
equate planned savings to planned investment. In the 
Kaldorian distribution mechanism this constitutes just the 
first step, since it is assumed that the price level 
reactsratherquickly to disequilibria in the commodity 
- -- -
market.Because it is assumed that wages are changing more 
slowly;-ene-hehaviour of the price level governs the beha-
viour of the share of profits. If there is unemployment, 
the share of profits declines, since there is excess supply 
in the commodity market. If there is excess demand, the 
share of profits increases. (All this may take place around 
an inflationary trend.) The mechanism can be formalized as 
(15) -IT = -a.·e (n,... for some a. > 0 
Now it is assumed that the speed of adjustment a. is very 
high as compared to the time-scale of our growth model. 
This means that as long as the adjustment mechanism (15) 
has a stable equilibrium solution no' i.e. as long as 
-1) The following is a somewhat personal interpretation of 
some remarks by KALDOR (1957) p. and {1968) p.197 ff. 
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(16 ) ) 2; o~n < n e(n, •••• "< 5 0 no e: (O,1) 
we can assume that the share of profits is no' Inserting this 
into the investment function gives actual investment. 
2. .~ Neoclassical Approach 
2.1. Cost Minimization1) 
If entrepreneurs behave as price takers, they will try to 
:Jnln1mize uni t cos ts. They think that they can hire as much 
labour 'and as much capital goods as they like at the ruling 
prices. Let the real wage rate be wand denote the real market 
rate of interest by p 2). At a given moment of time, unit costs 
c = ~ + £. y x 
-Entrepreneurs will try to minimize unit costs for the next 
period, i.e. they will try to minimize the expected change c 
.... 
in unit costs by a suitable rate of capital deepening k : 
l HS) c = w y 
.... 
£. 
x 
y x + w y + 
.e. 
x 
= min! 
k 
Since wand p are considered as exogeneous by the individual 
entrepreneur, in view-of rzr,m-the problem reduces to 
c'CP(k) 
.... 
.e. • k 
x 
= max! 
k 
1) This section owes much to parts of von WEIZSXCKERs analysis 
inchapter 3 of his book. 
2) that is, the difference between the market rate of interest 
and the expected rise in prices. 
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Denote the inverse function of ~'by r 
(20) y (. -1 :=~' (.) , hence y' -< 0 
then ·rtt.e 
(00 
k = 
is the unique solution of (19) if there exists a solution at 
all, but this will be taken for granted. According to (21), 
the sLope of the technicaL progress function at the cost 
minimizing rate of capitaL deepening equaLs the proportion of 
capitaL costs in totaL CQsts. 
-A 'Neoclassical' Investment Function 
To assume price taking behaviour and cost minimization is 
rather neoclassical indeed. It puts great emphasis on the 
~ole of factor prices concerning the choice of technique: The 
cost minimizing rate of capital deepening is determined by (21 
The simplest way to derive an investment function therefrom 
is to assume full employment of labour: 
I = K = .J! (koN) dt = 
With regard to p we assume that the rate of profit includes a 
constant risk premium a > 0 and that competition in the capital 
market assures always 
(We will encounter the difference a = r - p repeatedly, and we 
will always call it 'risk premium' for convenience, even in 
those cases where it is unrelated to risk.) 
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(9),(17), and (23) allow us to write1 ) 
-e/x 
c = 
'IT-x-a 
x-a 
the excess demand function {14) assumes the form 
e 
which clearly satisfies the short-run stability condition (16) 
of the Kaldorian adjustment mechanism: An increase in profit 
margins increases savings and reduces investment since the 
associated increase in the real rate of interest slows down 
capital deepening. Thus the adjustment mechanism generates a 
share of profits TIo which just equilibrates the commodity 
market and is defined by the condition e = 0 
of x 2) 
(26) TI 
o 
as a function 
The resulting actual rate of investment gives rise to an 
actual rate of capital deepening 
k{x) = [ TI (x) ex - a) 'Y x - a 
From 11 , (20) , (24) ,(25) it follows that k (x) is increasing in 
x: 
(28 ) dk dx > o 
Now we can go back to our earlier analysis of sections 1.2. and 
1.3. If we substitute (27) for (7), we get the result that the 
model converges towards a growth equilibrium where productivity 
rises with rate K and the output-capital ratio as well as the 
average saving propensity remain constant. But in view of our 
l)Since a/x ~ TI for economic reasons, we have x - a > O. 
~)We assume a-solution to e=O to exist. 
-analysis of cost minimization, we can even say more; In the 
Long run~ the sLope of the teahniaaL progress funation at K 
determines the proportion of aapitaL aosts in totaL aosts. If 
the reaL market rate of interest equaLs the rate of profits (i.e. 
if a = O)~ profitsshare is eventuaLLy determined by the sLope 
of the teahniaaL progress funation at K. The latter result is 
very neoclassical in several respects, but particularily in 
that distribution is determined by the character of technical 
progress alone1 ). 
Some more results are obtained from the long run conditions 
S(7T)·X = K + n 7T·x-a 
x-a = 
-(29) implies particularily: The higher the risk premium a, the 
higher will be the share of profits in the long run and the 
smaller will be the output-capital ratio2 ). 7T will always be 
somewhat above ~. (K) according to the risk premium required. 
-3. -On Two Themes by KALECKI 
Imperfect Competition 
The quite different Kaleckian 'degree of monopoly' approach 
leds to rather similar results, but these are resulting from a 
somewhar reversed causality3) • 
1) that is, ~. (K) = 7T , and ~. is indeed the Kaldorian analogue to 
the elasticity of output with respect to capital, as can 
readily be seen from 
~' = 
• ~. ~ 
dJ< y 
2) Differentiation of -(29) gives 
since 
sign dx Ocr sign 
1 > 7T > ~ ~ > 1 
x s' -
- -( a as) (1-7T).- - (1--) --I x x s < 0 
by ( 9) , (1 0) , (11 ) , (23) 
3) l<ALECKI 
/chapter 
(1954), chapters 1 and 2. See also von WEIZSKCKER, 
3. 
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Assume that raw material costs are proportionate to the wage 
bill. Then. prime costs, which are the sum of wages and raw 
material outlays, are proportionate to wage costs. The imper-
fection of the.product market determines the degree of monopoly 
and thereby the mark-up on prime costs. AS- a consequence, 
" . prices will a fixed multiple of wage costs per unit, and since 
the price level is taken as unity, this implies that real 
wage costs per unit (w/y) are-fixed. In other words, the sha~e 
of profits TI = 1 - w/y is determined by the degree of monopoly. 
TI = TI = constant 
In this case, clearly the Kaldorian stability mechanism (15) 
cannot work. Instead, we have to assume that wages are fixed 
exogeneously, for instance by collective bargaining. Prices 
are determined by mark-up pricing therefrom. 
If TI is constant, we know from (11) that the aggregate savings 
ratio will remain constant. Equilibrium in the commodity market 
and full employment would require a rate of capital deepening 
k = s(n)·x - n 
If (31) can be assumed to hold, we are back again to our simplest 
case, but how does (31) come about? 
It could be produced by changes in the real market rate of 
interest like that: The cost minimizing choice of technique 
obviously implies 
(32) k = r e/x } Yl p / x + w7y 
Now assume Y > s·x - n • There will be excess demand in the 
commodity market and excess demand for loanable funds. 
14 
-This will drive the money rate of interest upward, the real 
rate will follow, and this finally establishes equilibrium in 
the commodity market. For y < s·x - n , the mechanism works the 
other way round. ( Since mark up pricing is assumed, all this 
leaves the rate of inflation unaffected. Changes in the rate 
of inflation cannot cause the real rate of interest to move 
in the other direction.) 
-In the long run, the result is very similar to the previous one, 
but the 'risk premium' is determined by the share of profits 
rather than the other way round, and profits share is determined 
by the 'degree of monopoly' primarily rather than by the character 
of technical progress. This has pQlicy implications of course. 
3.2. The Principle of Increasing Risk 
If one assumes, in a neoclassical vein, price taking behaviour 
of the individual firm and a constant returns to scale technology, 
the output level remains undetermined by profit maximization, 
and thus the level of investment is left undetermined, too. 
Nothing in this will be altered for the economy as a whole if 
the individual firms are subject to decreasing returns, since in 
that case it is the number of firms which remains undetermined1 ). 
Indeed, the neoclassical way of telling the story says us how 
to determine the choice of technique, but the level of invest-
ment is simply assumed to be such as to guarantee full employment. 
-A simple way out and towards a theory on the determination 
of the level of investment is to argue that the excess of 
the profit rate over the real market rate of interest gives 
the inducement to invest. This view, that it is cr which governs 
1) BLISS p.3, KALECKI (1937) p.441 f, 1954) p.91 
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the volume of investment, has been introduced by KALECKI and 
is underlying the approach of the so-called KEYNES-WICKSELL-
models, too 1 ) • 
Assume 
K l/J' > 0 
The positive slope of this function can be motivated by KALECKIs 
'principle of increasing risk,2): The larger the amount invested, 
the higher will be the risk incurred by the investor, and the 
higher will be the necessary risk premium. In addition, firms 
have to raise capital in imperfect capital markets. The greater 
the funds they want to raise, the higher will be the returns 
they have to offer in order to attract also those investors 
who are rather pessimistic concerning the firm's future, and 
so it is they who need a risk premium also. 
1) On KEYNES-WICKSELL models, see e.g. FISCHER. In this context 
it should be noted that the adjustment cost approach to the 
derivation of the flexible accelerator, which gives rise 
to investment functions like (33) in KEYNES-WICKSELL models, 
is not appropriate in our analytical framework, since in-
creasing average costs of new investment are embodied in 
the convex shape of the technical progress function already. 
On the adjustmen~cost approach, see GOULD, however. 
2) See KALECKI (1937).(1954) ch. 8 and 9, STEINDL, v. WEIZSXCKER 
chapter 3. The following states KALECKls position in a very 
abriged if not amputated form since I do not wish to compli-
cate things by distinguishiQq between entrepreneurial 
capital and borrowed capital. Although this is a rather central 
pOint in KALECKI, I do not feel that it is particularily 
relevant in the present context. Furthermore, I do not want to 
distinguish here between the actual rate of profit and the 
prospective rate of profit as KALECKI and KALDOR (1961) do, 
but this distinction will be implicit in the analysis of the 
following chapter. 
Still another motivation for (33) is to assume that firms 
are making investment decis30ns depend~nt on the 'payoff 
period' of investment, which obviously varies with o. See 
von WEIZSACKER for a detailed discussion of this approach. 
In view of the cost minimizing condition (21) which involves 
the real market rate of interest, one might think that p governs 
the choice of technique and a=r-p determines the volume of 
investment in this theory. But as KALECKI (1937) has argued, 
this need not be so. If capital is scarce, entrepreneurs will 
maxi~ize the return on capital rather than minimize costs 1 }. 
Instead of (18) we will have to maximize 
x 
- wo -y 
with respect to k which gives the solution 
(35) k = 
Since TI = rox, the rate of profit (and not the rate of interest) 
determines the choice of technique. 
In order that the decisions made according to (35) concerning 
the choice of technique be compatible with the volume of in-
vestment as determined by (33), the real market rate of interest 
has to be fixed appropriately. If this is possible, we arrive at 
the same result as in the 'neoclassical' case for a = 0, since 
then (21) and (35) are identica12 }. 
But it is highly improbable that the model will meet the short 
run stability condition (16) since if there is ~xcess demand 
in the commodity market , this will raise profit margins and 
thereby increase investment demand even more. In addition, 
the rise in the price level lowers ceteris paribus the real 
market rate of interest, which increases investment demand 
1) This view, that the real rate of interest does not affect 
the choice of technique, seems to be implicit in the KEYNES-
WICKSELL models also. 
2} KALDORs analysis of this problem seems to be erroneous, see 
KALDOR i1961} p.211. Even if one deletes (35) and writes K as 
a function of r alone (i.e. for fixed p), the resulting rate 
of capital deepening will be a function of x alone, and the 
analysis of section 1.3. will be applicable. 
-also. In order to stabilize the model one had to introduce 
a monetary mechanism which makes the money rate of interest 
to react very violently to disequilibria in the commodity 
market. Indeed, changes in the money rate of interest had to 
offset both the changes in profit margins and inflation. I 
doubt that this is possible even under a monetarist rule in 
realistic circumstances. Perhaps one has to pilot the economy 
manually by means of the market rate of interest and by con-
trolling profit margins via effective demand. Nevertheless, 
if a given stabilization polic~ succeeds, we know the out-
come~)so I leave this section as it is. 
4 A Keynesian Approach 
4.1. The Corfu Investment Function 
I have gone into all this in order to contour some patterns 
of investment behaviour yielding very similar results. But 
perhaps everything works the other way round, perhaps reality 
is Keynesian2 ) • 
Take, as a convenient starting point, the investment function 
proposed by KALDOR at the Corfu Conference of the I.E.A. 3 ) 
(36) k(t+8) = <p - 1 (9 (t) ) + J..I. x (t) 
There is an investment lag 8. Firms think that demand will 
1) Things will become rather complicated, if (21) instead of 
(35) is assumed, since then changes in the morey rate of 
interest will steer both the choice of technique and the 
level of investment. Save by mere coincidence, one of 
these quantities will be steered wrong. 
2) The--adjective 'Keynesian' refers to the stress on demand 
expectations rather than th KEYNES' original investment 
theory, which is a short run theory and cannot be discussed 
in the pr.sent context. See KEYNES ch. 11, however. 
3) KALDOR(1961). Some misprints have been corrected in KALDOR 
(1970). I do not discuss KALDORs first investment function 
here. It seems not to be very appropriate sipce an exogeneously 
fixed accelerator is presupposed, but in o~~ model the capital-
output ratio 1/x varies endogeneously.~his seems to have 
been recognized by KALDOR, (1961) p.212 n. 
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increase at the present rate y, and in order to meet this 
expected demand increase they had to plan a rate of capital 
deepening ~~ (y). But the actual rate which is planned 
according to (35) is modified according to whether the out-
put capital ratio rises or declines. The argument behind 
that is that increases in the output-capital ratio are re-
flecting increases in the competitiveness of new investment 
as compared to old investment. Thus the difference between 
the prospective rate of profits on new investment and 
• 1) 
the actual rate of profits will be increasing if x increases 
If this difference is very high, firms will invest more than 
is necessary to meet expected demand since they will try to 
increase their respective market shares. 
To sum up, the first term in (36) is Keynesian: It gives the 
amount of investment which is necessary to attain the planned 
increase in output according to expected demand, and the second 
term gives the cost inducement to invest. 
If (36) is incorporated into the model, we get a mixed 
difference-differential equation which is too troublesome to 
analyze. It will be sufficient for our purposes to assume that 
the investment lag e is sufficiently short as compared with 
the time scale of our model as to allow for the TAYLOR approxi-
mation 
• 
"" (37) k(t+e) '" k(t) + eek(t) 
1 KALDOR (19~1) ~. 216, states this a little differently. De-
note by r ,~ and x+ the prospective rate of profit, the 
expected prof1t margin and the expected output capital ratio 
respectively. Clearly we have r+ = n+ex+. ~ssume n+ = n 
and x+ = x + vex, implying r+ - r = ven e x. Ifven 
remains constant, we get (36), but one cannot assume this 
even if n+were based on past values of n. Nevertheless (3~) 
might serve as a first step. 
To simplify further we _write x instead of x 
Thus_ we get: 
1 
. 
... 
k(t) + e·k(t) = <I> -1 (9 (t)) + ll· x (t) 
which reduces, in view of (1 -, to 
• 
... 
k (t) v -
i.e. the change of the rate of capital deepening is governed 
by the change of the output-capital ratio. Together with (4) 
we obtain the differential equation 
. 
... ... ... 
(40) k(t) = v·(<I>(k} - k) 
which has the unique stable equilibrium solution k = K • Since 
there is an investment lag, investment 1s--f1,~ed at any point of 
time independently of the share of profits. Therefore the Kal-
dorian stability mechanism (15) ,(16) works again and the 
... 
share of profits is determined by the equation s(~}'x = k + n , 
... ... 
where x results from x =<I>(k} - k and its initial value. 
If entrepreneurs behave according to the investment function 
(39)~ the rate of capital deepening and the rate of productivity 
growth will approach K 
-a constant x IHhich is 
share of profits will 
~ the output-capital ratio will approach 
depeml8n't on. initiaZ conditions~ and the 
approach ~ = s -1 (K+n) Ix) • 
This result is in marked contrast to the other results previous-
ly arrived at since income distribution will be dependent on 
initial conditions and transitory changes in the rate of 
capital deepening will have lasting effects on income distri-
bution. For instance, if the economy is in a growth equilibrium 
... ... 
with k = K and k is increased by a disturbance of the system, 
1 this is merely technical. It is easily checked that it does 
not affect our main conclusion. 
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x will decline and the share of profits will approach a higher 
level and will remain there. 
But how to reconcile all this with cost minimization? There 
is no problem 
guarantee 1T ~ 
interest will 
of course if initial conditions are such as to 
-1 Y (K). In this case, the real market rate of 
assure equilibrium as described in section 3.1. 1 ) 
4.2. Another 'Keynesian' Investment Function 
In this section I will try to rear another Keynesian investment 
function from KALDORs ideas underlying (36). 
Consider first the Keynesian term. Firms invest in order to 
meet expected growth in demand, call it A , and they form their 
expectations by exponential smoothing 2 ): 
1) ~One has to assume again that the impact of inflation on the 
real market rate of interest does not generate a Wicksellian 
cumulative process, for instance by assuming that the long 
run expectations are responding quite slowly to transitory 
changes in the rate of inflation. 
2) This is rational if firms think y to be generated by the 
stochastic model 
(') yet) = net) + u(t) 
(' ') net) = n(t-1) + £(t) 
where u(t) and £(t) are normally distributed disturaances 
with mean zero and variances v,v , respectively. Then the 
u £ 
(unbiased) maximum likelihood forecast for y(t+1) is given 
by 
( " , ) A(t+1)= A(t) + S*lY(t)->.(t» 
where S is a function of v and v • (see SCHLICHT). (" ') is 
the discrete counterpart u of £ (42). The model ('),(' ') 
seems to be rather acceptable in that firms think that long 
run growth rates n are changing rather slowly according to 
("), but actual growth in demand is subject to short-run 
disturbances u, as in (I). 
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( U) 
-00 
or 
(42) A = e· y 
-In the following ,-the demand inducement to invest will be 
taken as ~-1 (A). 
In modification of the second term in (36), the cost inducement 
to invest, I assume that firms are minimizing unit costs according 
to (21), that the capital market is cle3red by changes in 
p as discussed in section 3.1., and I assume above all that 
it is the change in ,unit costs brought forth by changes in 
x and y what matters. From (18) we see that the reduction 
1n un1t costs caused by changes in x and y is 
-w A P A 
_ey + _ex 
y X 
Xf (21 -holds, this quantity is equal to 
(44 ) 
which is decreasing in k and increasing in x. 
Now, if we were to write this term instead of KALDORs x, we 
would get an undesired simultaneity: Expectations are causing 
A 
current decisions on k which determine those expectations in 
turn. This seems to be not very meaningful from am economic 
point of view • I assume instead that firms guess productivity 
changes according to their demand expectations A : Firms 
expect cost reductions to be 
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instead of (44),-, Q4 ~~~, 'Eii:t.t g~ ~~~ h btvest can 
be written ~ 
e: = e:(A,X) 
(Of course (46) is sufficiently general as to be deducible 
from other arguments as those underlying (45).) 
Now the development of the model can be described completely. 
~ 
cf> -1 (A k = + e:(A,X) 
... 
A = 8 - ( cf>(k) - A ) 
~ ... 
... 
cf>(k) 
- k x = 
(47) are the Kaldorian ideas in a different guise. These 
tnree equations can be reduced to two: 
(50) A = 8- , 
~ 
-
Ccf>(cf>-1(A ... - + e:(A,X») x = 
Substitute into (47) ,(48) according to 
z = In x , ... z = x 
and write down the Jacobian 
) 
-
- cf>-1 (A) 
z 
x = e 
- e:(A,X) 
-) 
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'f 
'.ll .ll.. B" q, I. £ en ()z ' A 
(53) J = = 
dZ dZ - - 1 
ax- E -(1-q,')· ( £A + 4» 
It is easy to check that the OLECH conditions 1 ) -for global 
stability 
(54) tr J < 0 det J > 0 
are fulfilled as long as the weak additional assumption 
is introduced. This means that, as long as t~ere exists an equi-
librium solution to (50),(51) at all, it will be unique and 
globally stable. Thus we get a quite different result than 
in the Corfu case: The Long run output aapitaL ratio wiLL 
approaah an equiLibrium vaLue whiah is independent of initiaL 
aonditions. The rate of produativity growth and the rate of 
aapitaL deepening wiLL approaah K and the share of profits 
as weLL as the average savings propensity wiLL approaah an 
equiLibrium vaLue independent of initiaL aonditions. 
4.3. The Cost Inducement to Invest 
Thus we have arrived at a by now familiar result, but this 
result is crucially dependent on the assumption that the cost-
1) see GARCIA p.541 
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inducement to invest is a function of x. If we replace (46) 
by 
(56) E = E(A) 
the system (47)-(49) reduces to 
(57 ) 
which is clearly stable, but the resulting x and hence the 
resulting income distribution remains dependent on the initial 
conditions as in the Corfu case, where the influence of x is 
absent, too. 
It is perhaps appropriate to mention still another point. 
One could consider it as a 'pure' Keynesian case if all 
investment is demand induced and cost-inducement is zero. 
Assume.this. Assume E = 0 in (57). This implies ~ = 0 and 
,.. 
hence k = 0 : A given rate of capital deepening will be main-
tained forever. Any given growth rate y will be maintained 
because it is expected to remain and this expectation is 
fulfilled. This implies of course that profits share will 
,.. ,.. 
continuously decline for k < K and increase for k > K , re-
spectively. All this gives perhaps a new twist to the old 
puzzle whether it is growth which generates profits or 
whether it is profits which promote growth: Both profits and 
growth might be generated by the mere momentum of inertia in-
herent in the economy. 
5. Conclusion 
I am unable to put together the many open ends of the above 
tangle. What I have tried to show is that there are some 
" 
puzzling problems relating to investment in a growth context,~j: 
some of them being of considerable import indeed. But even if 
one arrives at the conclusion that it is solely promising to 
deal with those problems discussed above in a much broader 
context, say of cyclical growth or involving monetary phenomen~, 
the above might have supported this conviction and might 
have been not entirely futile therefore. 
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